I love this man's music.
The last track is called 'Orphic hymn': it's a setting of part of Ovid's Metamorphoses
Friday, September 09, 2016
Friday, May 01, 2015
Electioneering
It's not surprise, of course, that these parties engage in an organised attempt to provide positive commentary to their views. I've no idea whether this helps at all or whether it just provides distraction for those of us who can't help reading all this stuff. But it is, in the end, not particularly persuasive. If the last 1000 Owen Jones retweets haven't made you think that David Cameron is out to destroy all that is good, then I doubt the 1001st will either. The overall effect is not that different from what happens when supporters of football teams head to twitter or phone in to 6-0-6 with Robbie Savage. Your midfielder's embarrassing slip that cost a goal is worth all sorts of songs, videos, parodies, comment. Our midfielder's brave last-ditch effort that unfortunately didn't quite come off is praiseworthy and noble. We have an organised defence; you park the bus.
Here is how one of these political irregular verbs goes:
I make a cast-iron promise.
You deceive the electorate with false promises.
He is Nick Clegg.
We have a proven track-record of delivering clear progress.
You cocked everything up last time you had a go.
They won't do anything much.
I'm bored by the whole lot and I shouldn't be. The leaflets and the debates have just become noise. I think what is most disappointing is that I am now finding it hard to distinguish between election leaflets and those flyers and bits of junkmail you get trying to persuade you to change broadband provider or mobile phone contract. We are being sold something, not presented with a positive idea of something we can all do better. (Even when the leaflets say that this is a positive idea of something we can do better, in fact they are trying to sell us something, like those companies that pretend you can save the planet by drinking a certain kind of smoothie.) So, the parties all promise that we can get things that are better, quicker, faster but we don't need to pay more. Brilliant! And they will super-promise all that with a five-year price deal for new voters. (One of my local candidates has a leaflet that contains a list of five promises. The fifth promise is a promise to keep all his promises.) I don't believe all this guff any more than I believe that Sky broadband is eminently superior to Virgin broadband. In any case, choosing who should represent my constituency in Parliament is not equivalent to choosing a home insurance provider.
And if that doesn't get to you, the moral overtones will. This is perhaps what annoys me the most about the party system. This choice between different package deals comes wrapped in the pretence of an ethical standard. The red team says that if you vote blue then you are a heartless bastard who wants to see children starve and disabled people flogged because they can't work. The blue team says that if you vote for the red team then you're a naive idiot who thinks that money can be conjured from thin air and that someone else should pay for you to do less. You're either heartless or stupid. The yellow team says that the other two teams are liars and that they will do a bit of one and a bit of the other: more heart and more brain. The other teams say that the yellow team is both heartless and naive. The green team says that everyone who doesn't like their team hates all other people and wants the planet to burn up. The purple team says all the other teams just want to carry on playing a game of pass the parcel and that real people are fed up with it and that they want a turn at passing the parcel too.
In both ways we are treated like idiots. The audience on BBC's Question Time last night was prepared to demand that the politicians on parade answered questions we want answered. They didn't get much joy, but it was great to see that they weren't impressed by the evasion.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
O tempora! O montem!
Harry Mount is depressed about the way Classics is going in British schools and, it seems, also about standards in Classics departments in universities. Here is his piece setting out where, how, and why things are going wrong.
There are lots of ways you might respond to it. Edith Hall has already had a go. And there are lots of other ways you might reply to Mount's rhetoric. E.g., he writes that Latin GCSE is depressingly easy:
But here is another claim that I think I am able to speak to. Mount writes:
The shame is that deep down there is not really, I think, any serious disagreement about what we all want, those of us in the business. We want there to be people who can go on to continue further detailed study and research into the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. And yes, that means there must be people who know Latin and Greek really well. And we want people who can do more than spot a deponent verb because we need people who can ask interesting questions of the Latin and Greek that they read. And people who can read Plato and think about political philosophy or modern metaphysics. And people who can read Lucan and think about Shakespeare. And people who excavate Roman sites. And so on. What's more, we want there to be as many people as possible who have been exposed to these fascinating texts, times, places, and objects who don't make a career of it but who nevertheless carry that exposure with them in whatever else they do.
So it isn't true that people either learn Latin and Greek 'properly' in Mount's terms or they do Classical Civilisation. One will tend to lead to the other, in both directions. What is the point of learning the verb tables if not to read the works and think about them? Won't any enthusiasm for the classical world lead to a degree of interest in those ancient languages?
Casting the debate as Mount does won't ensure the healthy future of the Classics he and I love.
There are lots of ways you might respond to it. Edith Hall has already had a go. And there are lots of other ways you might reply to Mount's rhetoric. E.g., he writes that Latin GCSE is depressingly easy:
You can infer from this two things. First, Mount is an excellent Latin tutor. Second, that if indeed Virgil himself would have struggled in the Latin O-level then it is hard to imagine just what that O-level was supposed to evaluate. Not a competence (brilliance even) in Latin, apparently.As a part-time Latin tutor, I’m staggered by the low standards. One of my pupils – a bright boy, certainly, but with only two years’ Latin under his belt – got 97 per cent in his GCSE. Even Virgil would have struggled to get 97 per cent in the old O-Levels.
But here is another claim that I think I am able to speak to. Mount writes:
Because the subject is now only properly taught in independent and grammar schools, high entrance standards would eliminate practically all comprehensively-educated applicants. And so they have to dumb down even further in order to admit those pupils.I really don't know what to do with that. It will hardly help for me and various other people who are involved in university admissions simply to deny that it is true. We would deny it, wouldn't we? It will hardly help for me to point to various excellently-taught comprehensive school pupils and also point to the fact that there is a lot of fine teaching of Classics (and, yes, Classical Civilisation) in comprehensive schools that leaves students who do not go on to study the subject at university with an enthusiasm and interest for history, philosophy, languages, literature and the like.
The shame is that deep down there is not really, I think, any serious disagreement about what we all want, those of us in the business. We want there to be people who can go on to continue further detailed study and research into the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. And yes, that means there must be people who know Latin and Greek really well. And we want people who can do more than spot a deponent verb because we need people who can ask interesting questions of the Latin and Greek that they read. And people who can read Plato and think about political philosophy or modern metaphysics. And people who can read Lucan and think about Shakespeare. And people who excavate Roman sites. And so on. What's more, we want there to be as many people as possible who have been exposed to these fascinating texts, times, places, and objects who don't make a career of it but who nevertheless carry that exposure with them in whatever else they do.
So it isn't true that people either learn Latin and Greek 'properly' in Mount's terms or they do Classical Civilisation. One will tend to lead to the other, in both directions. What is the point of learning the verb tables if not to read the works and think about them? Won't any enthusiasm for the classical world lead to a degree of interest in those ancient languages?
Casting the debate as Mount does won't ensure the healthy future of the Classics he and I love.
Sunday, March 08, 2015
Admission. And Finland for Eurosong 2015!
This term I have mostly been getting to grips with a new admin job looking after graduate 'affairs' (as the job title unfortunately has it) in the Faculty. And I've learned lots of things many of which are beginning to make me depressed about the chances of good students, particularly from the UK, being funded to do Master's and then PhD degrees. I wonder if in twenty years time we'll be looking round wondering where this generation of UK academics in the humanities has gone. But I'll keep my peace on that for now, at least until I've seen enough of it to think I have something more to say than a general list of complaints.
I also get to spend much more of my time in meetings than I am used to. Meetings are only sometimes useful, of course, and often the principal use of the meeting is to demonstrate that more than one person is responsible for a certain decision. I would much rather, of course, be talking to a student about some ancient philosophy or thinking myself about some ancient philosophy but so be it. We all have to do our turn.
But term will end soon! Hooray!
Things to look forward to then include a Philosophy 'Masterclass' (Open Day) thing at my college and the chance to think a bit more carefully about a chunk of Plato's Philebus I need to get to grips with before September.
And my mood hasn't really been spoiled by yesterday's news that the BBC has opted for this pile of poo as the UK's Eurosong entry. Now, we all know that there is no point entering a song that's any good and that no one who actually fancies a career in music would go anywhere near this toxic competition, but come on, really? I read somewhere that it was written by the same musical genius that gave us the theme tunes to Jim'll Fix It (you don't hear that very often anymore) and Challenge Anneka. Finger on the pulse...
(If you stick with it up to 1m 53s it gets particularly bad.)
Anyhow, all is not lost because we need to get behind Finland's entry: Pertti Kurikan Nimipäivät.
Here is their song:
And here is a part of a documentary about them in which they get sweary about pedicures:
I also get to spend much more of my time in meetings than I am used to. Meetings are only sometimes useful, of course, and often the principal use of the meeting is to demonstrate that more than one person is responsible for a certain decision. I would much rather, of course, be talking to a student about some ancient philosophy or thinking myself about some ancient philosophy but so be it. We all have to do our turn.
But term will end soon! Hooray!
Things to look forward to then include a Philosophy 'Masterclass' (Open Day) thing at my college and the chance to think a bit more carefully about a chunk of Plato's Philebus I need to get to grips with before September.
And my mood hasn't really been spoiled by yesterday's news that the BBC has opted for this pile of poo as the UK's Eurosong entry. Now, we all know that there is no point entering a song that's any good and that no one who actually fancies a career in music would go anywhere near this toxic competition, but come on, really? I read somewhere that it was written by the same musical genius that gave us the theme tunes to Jim'll Fix It (you don't hear that very often anymore) and Challenge Anneka. Finger on the pulse...
(If you stick with it up to 1m 53s it gets particularly bad.)
Anyhow, all is not lost because we need to get behind Finland's entry: Pertti Kurikan Nimipäivät.
Here is their song:
And here is a part of a documentary about them in which they get sweary about pedicures:
Wednesday, January 28, 2015
Some of what the ancient philosophy yoot are up to...
Peter Adamson pointed me to this interesting page, collecting titles of some current and recent doctoral research projects in ancient philosophy in the UK. The first thing to note is, I suppose, the number: more than 50 projects begun since around 2010. I don't think that's too shabby, to be honest, and it suggests that the discipline in general is in a relatively good state.
One point to bear in mind is that this is the list taken from the Institute of Classical Studies so it gives those projects that are in the main being done in Classics Faculties and Departments rather than in Philosophy. So the total number in progress will certainly be higher. And it also might account, I guess, for the fact that if you look down this list you'd be forgiven for thinking that Plato and Aristotle are not all that popular these days. That can't be true, can it? Would the picture be more familiar if we add in those projects being done also, say, in the Oxford Philosophy Faculty or in UCL and KCL Philosophy?
One point to bear in mind is that this is the list taken from the Institute of Classical Studies so it gives those projects that are in the main being done in Classics Faculties and Departments rather than in Philosophy. So the total number in progress will certainly be higher. And it also might account, I guess, for the fact that if you look down this list you'd be forgiven for thinking that Plato and Aristotle are not all that popular these days. That can't be true, can it? Would the picture be more familiar if we add in those projects being done also, say, in the Oxford Philosophy Faculty or in UCL and KCL Philosophy?
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
Studies in Ancient Moral and Political Philosophy
We take great pleasure in announcing the creation of a new series: Studies in Ancient Moral and Political Philosophy, to be published by Academia Verlag.
Besides the three co-editors, the advisory board includes: Gábor Betegh (Budapest, Cambridge), Marguerite Deslauriers (McGill, Montréal), Panos Dimas (Oslo), Susan Sauvé Meyer (U. of Pennsylvania), Pierre-Marie Morel (Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne), Jörn Müller (Würzburg), Ricardo Salles (UNAM, Mexico), Emidio Spinelli (La Sapienza, Roma), Teun Tieleman (Utrecht), Katja Vogt (Columbia, New York), James Warren (Cambridge).
The first volume - What is Up To Us. Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy (edited by P. Destrée, R. Salles and M. Zingano)- offers 22 chapters on the notion “to eph’ hêmin” from Democritus to Proclus, with a posthumous paper by Michael Frede.
Table of Contents (pdf)
We hope to be able to publish one or two volumes a year. We are glad to receive any proposals for a monograph or collective volume; they may be sent to either editor of the series. Pierre Destrée (Louvain), Christoph Horn (Bonn) & Marco Zingano (São Paulo)
Besides the three co-editors, the advisory board includes: Gábor Betegh (Budapest, Cambridge), Marguerite Deslauriers (McGill, Montréal), Panos Dimas (Oslo), Susan Sauvé Meyer (U. of Pennsylvania), Pierre-Marie Morel (Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne), Jörn Müller (Würzburg), Ricardo Salles (UNAM, Mexico), Emidio Spinelli (La Sapienza, Roma), Teun Tieleman (Utrecht), Katja Vogt (Columbia, New York), James Warren (Cambridge).
The first volume - What is Up To Us. Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy (edited by P. Destrée, R. Salles and M. Zingano)- offers 22 chapters on the notion “to eph’ hêmin” from Democritus to Proclus, with a posthumous paper by Michael Frede.
Table of Contents (pdf)
We hope to be able to publish one or two volumes a year. We are glad to receive any proposals for a monograph or collective volume; they may be sent to either editor of the series. Pierre Destrée (Louvain), Christoph Horn (Bonn) & Marco Zingano (São Paulo)
Sunday, January 18, 2015
And by March...
... the college gardens should be looking even better. But if you can't wait for then, you can look at some photographs by Dave Barton, the Head Gardener posted on his Flickr page.
Corpus Christi College Taster Days...
... or 'Masterclasses' as they are now branded. Through February and March the college is organising a series of days for Year 12 students to come and see what it is like to study various subjects here in Cambridge, meet some of the teaching staff and students and find out more about how to apply. The full list of subjects, with dates and details of how to apply, is here.
I will be doing some sessions on the Philosophy day on 20 March.
I will be doing some sessions on the Philosophy day on 20 March.
Thursday, January 08, 2015
Impact (literally)
I wonder if anyone else spotted that the bedtime reading of one of the character's in last night's episode of Silent Witness on BBC1 was Paul Cartledge's book Thermopylae (in Dr Alexander's left hand, in picture below). Now, without spoiling too much, it probably wasn't a great advert for the kind of effect that reading PAC's work might have on a young boy's psychology but nevertheless it's yet another sign of the excellent impact being made by the work of members of my Faculty. Hooray for us.
Friday, December 19, 2014
Pleasures online
Well, I'm sure that are all sorts of interesting things you can find online. But I've just spotted that the full text of my new book is available online if you or your institution has a subscription to the CUP 'Cambridge Books Online' site. The direct link is here. Of course, you should certainly buy a copy but this will no doubt be useful as a back-up...
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Funded doctoral research positions in Munich
The Munich School of Ancient Philosophy (MUSAΦ) invites applications for funded doctoral positions. Dissertation proposals are welcome in all areas of ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, the medieval reception in Arabic and Latin, and textual criticism. See the flyer, available here: http://www.musaph.uni-muenchen.de/download/flyermusaph2015.pdf
MUSAΦ is a joint program of the Classics and Philosophy Departments at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU). It is directed by Professors Peter Adamson, Oliver Primavesi and Christof Rapp. In addition, it boasts a substantial number of junior faculty and postdocs. Graduate students and visiting fellows round out the exceptionally large and lively ancient philosophy community, which provides an ideal environment for graduate study.
Doctoral fellowships cover three years, the period of dissertation research and writing. Complementing their dissertation research, doctoral students in MUSAΦ participate in a wide array of advanced seminars, reading groups and workshops. Doctoral students may also avail themselves of the opportunity to teach if desired. Since the number of fellowships is limited, we encourage applicants to seek out external funding as well.
Although based in Germany, most of the advanced instruction takes place in English and there is no formal language requirement. Dissertations may be written in German or in English.We welcome applicants with a sufficient working knowledge of one of these languages and a willingness to attain basic skills in the other.
We strongly encourage interested students to apply by February 15th, 2015 for full consideration. We hope to make initial offers immediately afterwards. Applications will continue to be considered on a rolling basis as long as places remain.
Please visit our website (www.musaph.uni-muenchen.de) for more information about the program and about how to apply. Inquiries about the program may be directed to: musaph@lmu.de. Students who are not yet prepared to begin dissertation research might be interested in the Masters Program in Ancient Philosophy at LMU.
Monday, December 08, 2014
CFP: War and strife in ancient philosophy
Our excellent graduates are organising another of their successful annual graduate conferences. This year the theme is 'War and Strife in Ancient Philosophy', to be held in Cambridge on 27-28 March 2015 and you can find the website with details of how to submit abstracts, accommodation etc. here.
This is the fifth in a series of annual conferences, all completely organised by our graduate students. They are always fun and intellectually stimulating occasions.
This is the fifth in a series of annual conferences, all completely organised by our graduate students. They are always fun and intellectually stimulating occasions.
Monday, December 01, 2014
Misc.
1. This is the best online advent calendar.
2. There are lots of sentimental songs about being a parent. I'm not sure this is very sentimental but I think it's lovely.
3.If you are looking for Xmas presents for the scientist/philosopher/academic in your life, you can do worse than browse what's available here. The goodies include, for instance, a set of Rorschasch ink-blot test coasters.
4. Winter's evenings are good for ghost stories. The BBC's Remember Me is unsettling but I'm not sure why. It's got Robert Baratheon out of off of GoT/Hercules out of off of Atlantis in it as a slightly rubbish police detective.
2. There are lots of sentimental songs about being a parent. I'm not sure this is very sentimental but I think it's lovely.
3.If you are looking for Xmas presents for the scientist/philosopher/academic in your life, you can do worse than browse what's available here. The goodies include, for instance, a set of Rorschasch ink-blot test coasters.
4. Winter's evenings are good for ghost stories. The BBC's Remember Me is unsettling but I'm not sure why. It's got Robert Baratheon out of off of GoT/Hercules out of off of Atlantis in it as a slightly rubbish police detective.
Wednesday, November 26, 2014
PGR rankings for Ancient Philosophy
As detailed here. Any thoughts?
The schools are ranked in peer groups by their rounded mean score to .5 intervals; after a school's name appears the median and mode scores. Where the median and mode scores are higher than the rounded mean that usually indicates that a minority of evaluators scored the program a bit more lowly than others.
Group 1 (1-2) (rounded mean of 4.5)
Oxford University (5, 5)
Princeton University (4.5, 4.5)
Group 2 (3-6) (rounded mean of 4.0)
Cambridge University (4, 3)
Stanford University (4, 4 & 4.5)
University of Toronto (4, 4)
Yale University (4, 4)
Group 3 (7-10) (rounded mean of 3.5)
Cornell University (4, 4)
University of Arizona (3.5, 4)
University of Chicago (3.5, 2.5)
University of Texas, Austin (3.5, 2.5 & 4)
Evaluators: Rachel Barney, Jessica Berry, Tad Brennan, Christopher Bobonich, Victor Caston, Dan Devereux, David Ebrey, Gail Fine, Brad Inwood, Terence Irwin, Thomas Johansen, Mohan Matthen, David Sedley, Christopher Shields, Allan Silverman, Nicholas Smith, Katja Vogt, Jiyuan Yu.
The schools are ranked in peer groups by their rounded mean score to .5 intervals; after a school's name appears the median and mode scores. Where the median and mode scores are higher than the rounded mean that usually indicates that a minority of evaluators scored the program a bit more lowly than others.
Group 1 (1-2) (rounded mean of 4.5)
Oxford University (5, 5)
Princeton University (4.5, 4.5)
Group 2 (3-6) (rounded mean of 4.0)
Cambridge University (4, 3)
Stanford University (4, 4 & 4.5)
University of Toronto (4, 4)
Yale University (4, 4)
Group 3 (7-10) (rounded mean of 3.5)
Cornell University (4, 4)
University of Arizona (3.5, 4)
University of Chicago (3.5, 2.5)
University of Texas, Austin (3.5, 2.5 & 4)
Evaluators: Rachel Barney, Jessica Berry, Tad Brennan, Christopher Bobonich, Victor Caston, Dan Devereux, David Ebrey, Gail Fine, Brad Inwood, Terence Irwin, Thomas Johansen, Mohan Matthen, David Sedley, Christopher Shields, Allan Silverman, Nicholas Smith, Katja Vogt, Jiyuan Yu.
Monday, November 17, 2014
Keeling Scholarships in Ancient Philosophy (graduate) at UCL
UCL Philosophy is pleased to announce two Keeling scholarships for research in ancient philosophy for either the MPhil. Stud. or PhD, beginning in 2015. The Scholarships will fund tuition fees (UK/EU) and full AHRC-equivalent London maintenance for two years ( MPhil. Stud.), or for up to three years ( PhD).
MPhil Stud students awarded a Keeling Scholarship are required to specialise to some extent in ancient philosophy over the two year programme, by completing at least two half year modules in the area of ancient philosophy, and by writing their research thesis (30,000 words) on a topic in ancient philosophy. PhD students awarded a Keeling Scholarship will be pursuing a doctorate on a topic in ancient philosophy.
Those able to supervise graduate research in ancient philosophy at UCL include Fiona Leigh (Philosophy), M.M. McCabe (Philosophy), Mark Kalderon (Philosophy), Simona Aimar (Philosophy, from 2017), and, by arrangement, Jenny Bryan (Greek and Latin).
Details about our research programmes can be found here: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/prospective-students/mphil-stud-phd/philosophy-mphil-stud
London is a thriving centre for ancient philosophy. The Keeling Lecture and associated Graduate Masterclass is held annually at UCL, as is the biennial Keeling Colloquium. KCL and UCL co-convene a weekly ancient Greek reading group, and the Institute of Classical Studies hosts a fortnightly series of papers on a different theme each year, organised by academics from London working in ancient philosophy (UCL, KCL, Royal Holloway, Birkbeck, University of London).
Further information can be found here:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/keeling
http://www.icls.sas.ac.uk/events/diary-events/seminar-lecture-series
Only applicants to UCL Philosophy research programmes can be considered for a Keeling Scholarship. Applicants should indicate on their application form that they wish to be considered for the Keeling Scholarship by writing 'Keeling Scholarship' in section §29 'Funding'. The deadline for applications to these programmes is 5 January 2015.
Guidance on the UCL application process is here:http://www.ucl.ac.uk/prospective-students/graduate/apply/research/
Enquiries in the first instance should be directed to Dr. Fiona Leigh: fiona.leigh@ucl.ac.uk.
MPhil Stud students awarded a Keeling Scholarship are required to specialise to some extent in ancient philosophy over the two year programme, by completing at least two half year modules in the area of ancient philosophy, and by writing their research thesis (30,000 words) on a topic in ancient philosophy. PhD students awarded a Keeling Scholarship will be pursuing a doctorate on a topic in ancient philosophy.
Those able to supervise graduate research in ancient philosophy at UCL include Fiona Leigh (Philosophy), M.M. McCabe (Philosophy), Mark Kalderon (Philosophy), Simona Aimar (Philosophy, from 2017), and, by arrangement, Jenny Bryan (Greek and Latin).
Details about our research programmes can be found here: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/prospective-students/mphil-stud-phd/philosophy-mphil-stud
London is a thriving centre for ancient philosophy. The Keeling Lecture and associated Graduate Masterclass is held annually at UCL, as is the biennial Keeling Colloquium. KCL and UCL co-convene a weekly ancient Greek reading group, and the Institute of Classical Studies hosts a fortnightly series of papers on a different theme each year, organised by academics from London working in ancient philosophy (UCL, KCL, Royal Holloway, Birkbeck, University of London).
Further information can be found here:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/keeling
http://www.icls.sas.ac.uk/events/diary-events/seminar-lecture-series
Only applicants to UCL Philosophy research programmes can be considered for a Keeling Scholarship. Applicants should indicate on their application form that they wish to be considered for the Keeling Scholarship by writing 'Keeling Scholarship' in section §29 'Funding'. The deadline for applications to these programmes is 5 January 2015.
Guidance on the UCL application process is here:http://www.ucl.ac.uk/prospective-students/graduate/apply/research/
Enquiries in the first instance should be directed to Dr. Fiona Leigh: fiona.leigh@ucl.ac.uk
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
Just an inkling
I'm looking at Republic VII and trying to think through that argument about fingers and 'summoners of thought'. I've got as far as this passage:
As far as I can tell, it's the only use of the noun ἔννοια in the dialogue. (The verb is quite common. See e.g. 525c8.) My first question is: is ἔννοια here a cognitive faculty or capacity? Or is it some kind of cognitive content held in the soul? If the former, then it is perhaps like the references to how various things summon dianoia or call upon and awaken noēsis (e.g. 523d8-9). (This is how Griffith translates κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν: 'It would arouse the capacity for reflection in itself...') In effect, the point would be that the soul stirring up the ennoia in it just is the soul calling upon its intellectual abilities to puzzle over the question of what the one is. If the latter, then perhaps the soul asking what the one is involves the soul stirring up from within itself its ennoia of just that; it involves the stirring up of some cognitive content that answers or will help to answer the question of what the one is. Here the ennoia is the content of some kind of understanding and not the faculty by which we might hope to come to understand something. Any help out there with this one? I agree that the latter option would perhaps by the more surprising. It might even be a hint of the idea of some kind of innate understanding in every human soul: not a particularly unPlatonic idea, of course, but not something much emphasised in the Republic. And for that reason the former option is probably right. But it remains a little peculiar for Socrates to drop a new term in here when he has in the immediate context happily been using noēsis and sometimes logismos to do the same job.
Ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν· εἰ δ' ἀεί τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις.Here is the Grube translation:
524d8–525a2
Reason it out from what was said before. If the one is adequately seen itself by itself or is so perceived by any of the other senses, then, as we were saying in the case of fingers, it wouldn’t draw the soul towards being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the same time, so that nothing is apparently any more one that the opposite of one, then something would be needed to judge the matter. The soul would then be puzzled, would look for an answer, would stir up its understanding (ennoia), and would ask what the one itself is. And so this would be among the subjects that led the soul and turn it around towards the study of that which is.I'm puzzled about the phrase: κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν at 524e5 (Slings).
As far as I can tell, it's the only use of the noun ἔννοια in the dialogue. (The verb is quite common. See e.g. 525c8.) My first question is: is ἔννοια here a cognitive faculty or capacity? Or is it some kind of cognitive content held in the soul? If the former, then it is perhaps like the references to how various things summon dianoia or call upon and awaken noēsis (e.g. 523d8-9). (This is how Griffith translates κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν: 'It would arouse the capacity for reflection in itself...') In effect, the point would be that the soul stirring up the ennoia in it just is the soul calling upon its intellectual abilities to puzzle over the question of what the one is. If the latter, then perhaps the soul asking what the one is involves the soul stirring up from within itself its ennoia of just that; it involves the stirring up of some cognitive content that answers or will help to answer the question of what the one is. Here the ennoia is the content of some kind of understanding and not the faculty by which we might hope to come to understand something. Any help out there with this one? I agree that the latter option would perhaps by the more surprising. It might even be a hint of the idea of some kind of innate understanding in every human soul: not a particularly unPlatonic idea, of course, but not something much emphasised in the Republic. And for that reason the former option is probably right. But it remains a little peculiar for Socrates to drop a new term in here when he has in the immediate context happily been using noēsis and sometimes logismos to do the same job.
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
The memories of Eumaeus
Here is a podcast of the lecture I gave last week at the Festival of Ideas. I can't vouch for the sound quality (nor for the quality of the ideas) but it might be interesting to a few people.
And here is the accompanying Powerpoint with the slides so the presentation will make a little more sense. You'll have to guess when it's time to move on to the next slide... What fun!
And here is the accompanying Powerpoint with the slides so the presentation will make a little more sense. You'll have to guess when it's time to move on to the next slide... What fun!
Saturday, October 18, 2014
A big week
Lots to do next week. I have the usual lecturing and supervising (including one of the pair I am doing this year for the Classics Prelims people) but on Tuesday I'm also giving a talk for the university's Festival of Ideas before zooming over the Corn Exchange to see Johnny Marr (thanks, Sis, for the birthday present of the tickets). Then I'm braving the bus to Oxford to give a paper and will be hoping to be back in time for the usual round of teaching on Friday afternoon. Best part of the week will, of course, be the concert on Tuesday. Here's Johnny:
Thursday, October 09, 2014
Shelfie
Look, term has just begun and I have no idea which way is up, let alone any interesting ideas about some bit of ancient philosophy. Once the rush of meetings, arrangements, rearrangements of things that I thought had been arranged, last-minute changes of teaching or whatever, is over then we can get down to the proper business of teaching and thinking. (And there's a lot of good stuff happening here in Cambridge this term. I'm looking forward to working through PA 1 in the Thursday seminar, even though I have started to regret volunteering to introduce PA 1.3. If I ever work out who the 'dichotomisers' are I'm pretty sure I'll want to dichotomise them.) In the meantime, here's a shelfie:
Monday, September 29, 2014
Aristotle, civility, frankness
There has been some interesting and some helpful discussion recently about questions of civility and its proper place in academic life generally, and philosophy in particular. Here MM McCabe rightly, it seems to me, objects to the thought that civility is somehow to be opposed to freedom of speech or perhaps frank speech generally. (This goes both ways: an appeal to civility cannot by itself trump the free expression of someone's position and the fact that you are expressing your own position--in an academic matter or otherwise--does not all by itself excuse incivility.) Anyway, reading MM reminded me of some Aristotle and, in particular, in his account of what are sometimes referred to as 'social virtues'. Here he is (in Nicomachean Ethics 4.6) discussing how people should deal with one another both in what they say and what they do. (This is Ross' translation.)
In any case, the surrounding discussion makes clear that in these social dealings Aristotle thinks that there are two important factors: one is a question of truthfulness and sincerity in what we say and do and another is the question of causing pleasure or pain to the recipient or recipients of the words or actions. That seems right.
I think this contains some important and suggestive points. It's important that what is being discussed here is not confused with being 'friendly' or 'polite'; what matters is not the form of words that is used but the intention and purpose of the agent who is using them in a given social setting with a particular interlocutor. There are no set 'rules' that govern the way that a view can or should be expressed; what matters is why you are saying what you are saying, when, and to whom. The virtue being discussed here concerns dealings with people who are not friends (or, we might add, dealing with people who are friends but not qua friends, and so also colleagues, fellow academics etc.) Sometimes the right way to talk is to be critical and to cause offence but giving offence per se is not something worth aiming for.
Also important is something Aristotle mentions explicitly a little later in 4.8: that it is important not only to speak in the right way but also to listen in the right way too (1127b33-1128a2).
In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their duty 'to give no pain to the people they meet'; while those who, on the contrary, oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain are called churlish and contentious. That the states we have named are culpable is plain enough, and that the middle state is laudable- that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will resent, the right things and in the right way; but no name has been assigned to it, though it most resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle state is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that such a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a certain kind. For he will behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of these cases he will behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for intimates and for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to give pain to them.
While in NE 4.6 (and 2.7) this particular virtue isn't given a name there are various categorisations in EE 2.3 and 3.7 that are clearly related. The different texts divide things up in different ways. Also, Magna Moralia 1.27-32 has a tidy (perhaps too tidy) set of related social virtues, including being correctly indignant (nemesis) and being appropriately witty (eutrapelia). The most likely candidate for the name of what he is discussing in 4.6 is something like 'semnotēs'.Now we have said generally that he will associate with people in the right way; but it is by reference to what is honourable and expedient that he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life; and wherever it is not honourable, or is harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's action would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on that other, while his opposition brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but will decline. He will associate differently with people in high station and with ordinary people, with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class what is befitting, and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency. For the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.
The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described, but has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the direction of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer; while the man who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish and contentious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each other because the mean is without a name.
In any case, the surrounding discussion makes clear that in these social dealings Aristotle thinks that there are two important factors: one is a question of truthfulness and sincerity in what we say and do and another is the question of causing pleasure or pain to the recipient or recipients of the words or actions. That seems right.
I think this contains some important and suggestive points. It's important that what is being discussed here is not confused with being 'friendly' or 'polite'; what matters is not the form of words that is used but the intention and purpose of the agent who is using them in a given social setting with a particular interlocutor. There are no set 'rules' that govern the way that a view can or should be expressed; what matters is why you are saying what you are saying, when, and to whom. The virtue being discussed here concerns dealings with people who are not friends (or, we might add, dealing with people who are friends but not qua friends, and so also colleagues, fellow academics etc.) Sometimes the right way to talk is to be critical and to cause offence but giving offence per se is not something worth aiming for.
Also important is something Aristotle mentions explicitly a little later in 4.8: that it is important not only to speak in the right way but also to listen in the right way too (1127b33-1128a2).
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