Self-reflection

I'm putting together a brief bibliography of discussions of the nature and practice of the study of ancient philosophy.  This is what I have so far.  What have I missed?

Aubenque, P. (1992) ‘L’histoire de la philosophie, est–elle ou non philosophique?  Oui et non’, in B. Cassin (ed.) Nos grecs et leurs modernes, Paris: Seuil: 17–36

Burkert, W., Gemelli Marciano, L., Matelli, E. and Orelli, L. (eds.) (1998) Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike / Le raccolte dei frammenti di filosofi antichi, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht

Barnes, J. (2002) ‘La philosophie entre guillemets’, in M. Canto and P. Pellegrin (eds.) Le style de la pensée: recueil de textes en hommage à J. Brunschwig Paris: Les Belles Lettres: 522–47; English version, ‘Philosophy within quotation marks?’, in J. Barnes (2011) Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 23–42

Brunschwig, J. (1992) ‘L’histoire de la philosophie, est–elle ou non philosophique?  Non et oui’, in B. Cassin (ed.) Nos grecs et leurs modernes, Paris: Seuil: 37–96

Frede, M. (1987) ‘Introduction: The study of ancient philosophy’, in M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: ix–xxvii

Frede, M. (1992) ‘Doxographie, historiographie philosophique et historiographie historique de la philosophie’, Revue de métaphysique et morale 97: 311–25

Makin, S. (1988) ‘How can we find out what ancient philosophers said?’ Phronesis 33: 121–32

Rée, J. (1978) ‘Philosophy and the history of philosophy’ in J. Rée, M. Ayers, and A. Westoky eds. (1978) Philosophy and its Past, New Jersey: Humanities Press: 3–39

Rorty, R. (1984) ‘The historiography of philosophy: four genres’ in R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (eds.) Philosophy in History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 49–75

Taylor, C. (1994) ‘Philosophy and its history’ in R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (eds.) Philosophy in History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 17–30

False character and false pleasure

I am trying to understand the reports about Theophrastus' criticism of Plato's account of false pleasure in the Philebus. We know about these criticisms from a brief report in Damascius. So, I'm really thinking about Damascius on Theophrastus on Plato on false pleasure. (I should get out more.) It's all a bit complicated and expressed very concisely. This is Theophrastus' second argument.

 Ἔτι, φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τριχῶς τὸ ψεῦδος· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἦθος ἐπίπλαστον ἢ ὡς λόγος ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμά τι ὄν. κατὰ τί οὖν, φησίν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ψευδής; οὔτε γὰρ ἦθος ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε λόγος οὔτε ὂν οὐκ ὄν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ψευδές, ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι χαρακτηριζόμενον. ἢ ῥητέον ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς διορισμούς ἐστι ψευδὴς ἡ ἡδονή· καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπλαστος, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιπλάστου ἤθους, καὶ ἄλογος, ἡ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἰς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀποπλανηθεῖσα δόξα καὶ τούτῳ ἐφηδομένη, καὶ μὴ οὖσα, ἡ κατὰ ἀπουσίαν τοῦ λυπηροῦ φανταζομένη ⟦ἡ⟧ ἡδονή, καὶ ταῦτα μὴ παρόντος ἡδέος. 

Damascius, Lectures on Plato’s Philebus §168 

Theophrastus argues as follows. There are three possible senses of ‘pseudos’ (falsehood): (a) an insincere or feigned (epiplaston) character; (b) a false statement (logos); (c) a ‘false’, i.e. non-existent, substance (ousia). But pleasure is neither a character, nor a statement, nor a substance and therefore a pleasure cannot be false. The argument relies on two things: the three-fold analysis must be exhaustive and it must be denied that pleasure fits in any of the three categories. Damascius attacks the second of these two things but his tactic is not straightforward.

He seems to argue that there can be false pleasures that arise from falsehood in each of the three senses that Theophrastus lists and accepts (ἢ ῥητέον ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς διορισμούς ἐστι ψευδὴς ἡ ἡδον). In that case, the pleasure must be said to be false in a derivative way since it is caused by or has as its object something that is false and fits into one of Theophrastus’ three categories.

I've only got as far as Damascius' reaction to (a). Damascius argues first that there is feigned pleasure (epiplastos hēdonē) that comes about because of feigned character (καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπλαστος, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιπλάστου ἤθους). I am not sure what he means. In particular, I am not sure whether the feigned character is the object of the pleasure or whether the pleasure is something being taken by someone who has a feigned character. To explain: perhaps Damascius means something like the following. I take pleasure in a colleague asking after the health of my children. But my colleague is merely feigning an interest in my children and in fact could not care less about their health. Perhaps the pleasure I feel might be false in the sense that it is caused by a feigned character. Alternatively, the situation might be as follows. Imagine I am feigning an interest in the health of my colleague’s children. (In fact, I couldn’t care less about them. I met them once at a party and they were very annoying.) I have heard they have been unwell and so, out of politeness, I ask how they are. My colleague replies that they are much better. I say how pleased I am to hear that, smile, and look to move the conversation on. In that case, the ‘pleasure’ that I experience might be said to belong to a feigned character.

Are these the interpretative options? If so, which is better?

Well, that's my job over

Harry Styles, of the haircut, has taken the advice of a philosophical friend and is teaching the world about philosophy. He's starting, as any good lecturer might, with Socrates.

Socrates, born in Athens in the 5th century BCE, marks a watershed in Ancient Greek philosophy.
— Harry Styles (@Harry_Styles) February 13, 2013

So, colleagues, we are no longer needed. At the time I am writing, this piece of doxography has been retweeted more than 41000 times.  So, there we are, fellow academics.  We failed to reach out sufficiently to a wider world of people hungry for philosophical advice (since, of course, that really is what we are supposed to do) and now, inevitably, our role will be usurped by popstars and 'slebs. It's all our own fault, so there's no use moaning about it.


(Thanks to JB for alerting me to the end of my useful working life.)

Cambridge 1959

Interesting to compare this (from the excellent BFI archive on YouTube) with more recent recruitment films:

Epicurean theology on TV

It's not often you get a reference to Epicurean theology in a Channel 4 comedy programme.  But here is just such a reference from an episode of Chelmsford 123 first shown in 1988.  (The Epicurean bit is here and you can watch the episode from the start here.)

Breaking point

Here’s a bit of Aristotle De Caelo 2.13:

ὥσπερ ὁ περὶ τῆς τριχὸς λόγος τῆς ἰσχυρῶς μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ πάντῃ τεινομένης, ὅτι οὐ διαρραγήσεται, καὶ τοῦ πεινῶντος καὶ διψῶντος σφόδρα μέν, ὁμοίως δέ, καὶ τῶν ἐδωδίμων καὶ ποτῶν ἴσον ἀπέχοντος· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἠρεμεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. 

This is like the hair that is stretched strongly but equally at every point at will not break, or like the case of the person who is intensely but equally thirsty and hungry, but who is equally distant from the food as from the drink – for he will necessarily stay put. 

Aristotle is interested in various explanations for why the earth stays where it is. He is discussing the idea that it stays where it is because of homoiotēs, i.e. because it is no closer to this edge of the cosmos that to the opposite edge and so has no more reason to move this way than that… Here are two other arguments of the same type.

I asked an engineer friend about the example of the hair. He said, first of all, that it is a silly example because as things are there will always be variations along the length of a hair or wire which mean that it will be weaker in one place than in another. This seemed to me to be a very unhelpful reaction since I wasn’t really interested in the facts of the matter. Just suppose that there were no such variations: this is a perfect and perfectly homogeneous hair or wire. Then what? He sighed and tried to leave. But I made him answer what he obviously thought was a very silly question. The answer I eventually got was that at a certain point the hair or wire would break at each and every place where there was a break between the atoms or molecules. This wouldn’t be of much interest to Aristotle, of course, who was convinced that atomism is a daft idea.

Then I wondered about the example of the person who is equally—and intensely—hungry and thirsty. There are obviously other versions of this (e.g. Buridan’s ass) but I like the detail in this version, particularly the idea that the opposing desires are for different objects but that the different objects are (i) desired with equal intensity and (ii) equally easy or equally difficult to obtain. There is no more reason to slake my thirst before satisfying my hunger than there is to satisfy my hunger before slaking my first. So, the argument goes, if I have no reason either to slake my thirst first or satisfy my hunger first I do neither – until, at least, one desire gets larger than the other or someone helpfully takes away the tray of biscuits and I then get released from my torture and pick up the mug of tea.

Here’s a thought: suppose this kind of reasoning is correct. Does it offer a way of avoiding acting in a way you know is contrary to your best interests? Suppose you know you’re the kind of person who over-indulges in puddings. One way to help yourself to do the right thing is to cultivate an equally intense desire for something else and make sure you have an equally easy-to-hand supply of all the different things you desire. This sounds like it might be more fun than Plato’s answer that you have to make sure you train your desires properly, have the desire for what is genuinely good always in command etc. etc. Instead, you should combat the potentially damaging desire by cultivating lots of other competing and equally intense desires. The just make sure that all of these competing desires are equally easy to satisfy.  You run the risk of never doing anything at all, but at least you won’t act in accordance with a damaging desire.

Policy question

I've just turned down a request to referee an article submitted to a journal because the (helpful) abstract made it clear that much of the argument was aimed at refuting something I wrote. Is that the right decision?  I was concerned I was precisely the wrong person to give the submission a fair assessment because, although I wrote about this stuff a long time ago, I wasn't sure I could give the criticisms a fair hearing. 

Does anyone else have a policy/view/thought about this?

What will I want?

There was an interesting column in the paper on Saturday by Oliver Burkeman.  It discusses the difficulties we all have in realising that we will change over time.  It's easier to recognise the fact that our characters, preferences, desires, and the like once used to be rather different from how they are now.  But we all tend to think that the way we are now is likely to be stable over time in a way that we know our past character was not.

Here is a link to the paper in Science by Jordi Quoidbach, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Timothy D. Wilson that sets out the research and the main conclusions.

Here is the abstract:

We measured the personalities, values, and preferences of more than 19,000 people who ranged in age from 18 to 68 and asked them to report how much they had changed in the past decade and/or to predict how much they would change in the next decade. Young people, middle-aged people, and older people all believed they had changed a lot in the past but would change relatively little in the future. People, it seems, regard the present as a watershed moment at which they have finally become the person they will be for the rest of their lives. This “end of history illusion” had practical consequences, leading people to overpay for future opportunities to indulge their current preferences.

I find it interesting because I have been thinking about prudential reasoning and, in particular, about extreme forms that recommend that our plans, decisions, and so on ought to take into account the consequences for our well-being throughout the remainder of our lives.  If it does not matter when a benefit or a harm happens within my life, then I have no reason to favour nearer rather than further goods, for example.  But if the 'End of History Illusion' holds, then this is one more psychological obstacle to making the right kinds of decisions, on this temporally neutral model.  Not only is it difficult to imagine how our character, plans, preferences and the like will alter over the remaining period of our lives, but we apparently suffer from the illusion that the character etc. we currently have is the one on which we should base decisions and plans from the remainder of our lives.  And in this we are very likely to be mistaken.

Tough, isnt' it?

Never go back?

I've been spending the last few days trying to get some thoughts together about a section of Diogenes Laertius book nine (9.67-73) where he mentions various earlier philosophers that were apparently admired by Pyrrho and then lists some poets and philosophers who might be thought to anticipate Pyrrhonism in one way or another.  It's all for an interesting conference in October.  (That will also be the first conference I will attend via video-conferencing, because it's mostly happening in New York and I can't get away in the first week or so of our term.)

Anyway, it's an odd feeling going back to some things that I haven't thought about very much since I wrote about them in my PhD.  When I look back it's quite amazing how much I must have read and how learned some of the footnotes seem.  Good job they are there, though, because so long as I have sufficient confidence in my former self I can shortcut what would have been a much longer job getting sorted all the tricky business of the scholarship on Diogenes' sources.

I'd prefer to be able just to write about Diogenes and to talk about what he is doing, but unfortunately sometimes it is hard to discern any clear organisation on his part and you do have to start wondering about just what has been cut and pasted together to end up with the text as we have it.

So, some of this at the moment seems quite slim pickings.  But you never know, perhaps inspiration will strike soon.

What Plato needs is a jazz background

Happy new year.  This amazing track was posted recently on The Philosophy Smoker.  It's Sidney Poitier reading Jowett's translation of the Cave simile from Republic VII against a jazz background.

Nice.

But that's not all.  There's a whole album of this stuff out there.

This is from it too, I think.  Part of the Apology.

Smooth.

Operation pedalo

I'm too worn out from admissions interviews and Christmas shopping to put anything philosophical up here.  But, instead, have a read about this anti-crime offensive by Cambridge police, who are trying to put a stop to bicycling naughtiness around the city.  The report is accompanied by an exciting gallery of pictures of naughty cyclists with their faces pixellated like they do on Crimewatch.  It will be quite a job for the police, I think, because there is a lot of naughty cycling in Cambridge.  Tut tut.

A personal statement (revisited)

This week, I have been reading lots of 'personal statements' from students applying for places at Cambridge.  The Sutton Trust has just published a report which raises concerns about the ways in which students from different backgrounds approach writing these statements and the different opportunities they might have for their statements to be checked and edited.  Also, there is obviously the fact that different students will have had different opportunities to engage in various activities that they can include in their statements.

This is not news.  (Though I imagine it is not a coincidence that The Sutton Trust should be reminding us all of the obvious this week as we listen to the radio before heading off to do some more admissions interviews.)  Nor is it something we don't bear in mind when we are reading these personal statements.

Here is a Grauniad article from 2009 (the URL unhelpfully suggests that we 'ignore' personal statements) that makes clear the general position.  I had something to say about it at the time: here.

For what it is worth, here are some other relevant and perhaps interesting links.

The Sutton Trust report

The (brief) advice on personal statements provided by the University of Cambridge

and, something I found a bit surprising, a website to which students can upload their draft statements and then invite feedback from other people browsing away.  Perhaps worth a few moments -- the 'advice' offered is sometimes quite an eye-opener.  Here is the collection of 'Cambridge personal statements'.  (Compare this site...)

Another Lectureship in Ancient Philosophy

...has been advertised, this time at Somerville College and the University of Oxford.  Further details will appear in due course here.

But you can download the Word documents for the Advertisement, Further Particulars, and Cover Sheet required for applications by clicking on the links.

Here is the advertisement:

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD SOMERVILLE COLLEGE IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY TUTORIAL FELLOWSHIP IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY IN ASSOCIATION WITH A COMMON UNIVERSITY FUND (CUF) UNIVERSITY LECTURERSHIP

 The University of Oxford: Somerville College and the Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford, invite applications from suitably qualified candidates for the above post starting 1 October 2013.

 This post is permanent, subject to the satisfactory completion of a review of the initial period of office by the College and the University. This review, which will take place no later than the fifth year of appointment, is intended to be constructive; it is non-competitive, and most postholders in Oxford complete it satisfactorily.

The area of specialization for this post is Ancient Philosophy. The successful candidate must be able to provide research-led teaching and supervision in Ancient Philosophy at all levels, undergraduate and graduate. Applications from candidates whose work complements the research and teaching of the Faculty, will be welcome; this includes especially candidates with expertise in Ancient Philosophy after Aristotle.

 The successful candidate should normally be able to give undergraduate teaching (in the form of tutorials) in at least two of Logic, General Philosophy and Moral Philosophy from the first year course and a variety of core areas for more advanced papers. A wider teaching repertoire is an advantage. The salary will be on grade 10a (£42,883 to £57,581 per annum, as at 1 October 2012) of the University’s pay and grading structure. Additional College allowances are payable.

The Further Particulars, with details about the position and how to apply, are available from the College and Faculty websites (http://www.some.ox.ac.uk and http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

 By 1 January 2013, the successful candidate must have received the degree of PhD (or equivalent), or attained a comparable level of publications.

The closing date for receipt of applications is Monday 14 January 2013.

Applications for this post are particularly welcome from women and black and ethnic minority candidates, who are under-represented in academic posts in Oxford. The University and the College are equal opportunities employers.

Phew

Phew. Bit hectic at the moment, despite the sabbatical. Quick trip to Paris then admissions interviews and a PhD viva to do.

But... My printer today spewed out what might be a first draft of the book I'm supposed to be writing. It will be chopped and changed a lot, but somehow I find it easier to spot the typos and see what has to be altered on a page rather than a screen. And its a nice feeling to see a pile of bits of paper rather than a list of files in a drop box window.

But, before I get to wield the red pen, there are a few more interviews to do next week. The coffee shop owners of Cambridge must be doing well at the moment sheltering the helicopter parents who sit fretting while their young things head off into the colleges.

Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy

A vacancy is being advertised at the University of Exeter (closing date 19th Dec.).  Details here.  And details about the department here.

Tordre le bâton dans l'autre sens...

I found in my pigeon-hole today (I suspect from the usual source) a copy of a review by Roger-Pol Droit of Xavier Pavie's Exercises spirituels. Leçons de la philosophie antique, from Le Monde of 23 November.

The review makes a very important point that the Hadot-style concentration on philosopy as a way of life and a kind of spiritual exercise, while it has significant merits, risks overlooking some rather important aspects of ancient philosophy specifically and philosophy itself more generally.  There was more to philosophy than working out a way of life and there still is more to philosophy than that.

Car il n'est nullement prouvé que la philosophie antique et ses multiples branches se réduisent aisément à la seule recherche de la sagesse et la sérénité de l'âme.  Si cette tâche est importante, il'n'en reste pas moins que mathématiques, logique, physique ou politique ne lui sont pas nécessairement tout entières subordonnées...   Si la philosophie est certes traversée de spiritualité, d'entraînement à la sagesse, de souci de soi, on ne saurait oublier qu'elle est aussi constituée de concepts, d'arguments, et même de pure théorie.  La partie des exercises spirituels vaut certes d'être reconnue.  Elle ne peut ni ne doit se prendre pour le tout.

Well said.

Isn't this a nice book cover?

Details of what's inside can be found here.

Republic VII in Lego

 

I found it here.

Plaisir chez Platon

And I will also be performing as part of this:

2012-2013 SÉMINAIRE DE PHILOSOPHIE ANCIENNE PARIS I-CNRS-LILLE III

 A. Jaulin, C. Cerami, M. Crubellier UMR 7219/UMR 8163

 Le plaisir dans les traditions platoniciennes et aristotéliciennes

 Première séance : Platon Vendredi 30 Novembre 14h-17h :

14h Charlotte Murgier : « Le plaisir dans le Timée de Platon ».
15h Karine Tordo-Rombaut : « Pourquoi Socrate conteste-t-il le choix du plaisir ? »
 16h Olivier Renaut : « Éduquer et transformer les plaisirs dans la cité ».

 La séance aura lieu en salle 1605, au centre Pierre Mendès-France, 90, rue de Tolbiac, 75013. (M° Olympiades (ligne 14), M° Place d'Italie, M° Tolbiac, Bus 62, 83).

Samedi 1er Décembre 10h-12h :
10h James Warren : « Pleasure and piety in Plato's Philebus ».
11h Sylvain Delcominette : « Plaisirs mélangés et plaisirs purs ».

La séance aura lieu en salle Cavaillès, UFR de Philosophie, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, 75005.

Les séances suivantes auront lieu les 1 et 2 février 2013 (L’ancienne Académie et Aristote), les 15 et 16 Mars (Aristote et l’exégèse grecque), les 5 et 6 Avril (Traditions arabes et latines).

Poetry in the museum

At the invitation of Carol Ann Duffy, ten poets will be taking up residencies across the University of Cambridge.  The Museum of Classical Archaeology will host Sean Borodale, whose recent Bee Journal was one of the Guardian's books of the year 2011.  Here is Sean's website, which unfortnately seems to be mostly dark grey text on a black background.  You can read an extract from it here.

And here is a picture of Vergil writing about bees from a 15th c. edition of the Georgics.