Psychology in the Non posse II

I suggested in the last post that Plutarch may have thought that the rational soul was tasked with both theoretical understanding of things that are necessary and eternal and also various things that could be otherwise, and that therefore the pleasure we take in learning historical facts and the like might still in his eyes be 'rational' pleasures. This was part of an attempt to understand Non posse 1092E.

The case is unfortunately not so clear-cut. On the other hand, Plutarch is evidently also concerned in this work to show that Epicureanism fails properly to acknowledge the natural sense in which humans take pleasure in fame and a good reputation. Much of the discussion from 1098E to 1100D, for example, is designed to show not only that there are examples of men who have taken proper pleasure in their noble achievements but also that there is a general desire for and enjoyment of such pleasures among humans. Indeed, Epicurus himself is criticised as inconsistent on this score: his own concern for a particular reputation is what drove him to disown and then slander his teachers and enjoyed the reverence paid to him by his followers (1100A–C). In the terms of Plato’s Republic, these would appear to be the pleasures of the spirited part of the soul, the thumoeides: see, for example, 581a9–b5. Furthermore, when Plutarch concludes this work he offers a summary of the various pleasures and goods which the Epicureans omit from a human life, he tells us that Epicurus blinds ‘the love of learning of the theoretical part of us and the love of honour of the action-guiding part of us’ (τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ φιλότιμον) to their due pleasures (1107C). Here, it seems more likely that the ‘action-guiding’ part, the praktikon, is to be thought of as rather similar to Plato’s thumoeides and not another aspect of the rational part of the soul. Is that what's meant also at 1092E?

Psychology in the Non posse

I’ve been thinking, prompted by the paper I gave at the Oxford Plutarch conference, about Plutarch Non posse 1092Dff. (chapter 9). Plutarch says that the Epicureans fail to include in their account of the good life a whole range of things which are pleasant, and properly pleasant to humans. For the most part, it seems to me that much of Plutarch’s case so far has drawn for its inspiration from Plato’s account of pleasure in Republic 9. But when Plutarch comes to offer his preferred characterisation of the pleasures appropriate to a rational human soul, he seems prepared to soften the restrictive account found in Republic 9. There, it is quite clear that Socrates wants true and pure pleasures, strictly understood, to be focussed only on objects which always are and are always unchanging. Most obviously, this is a reference to the Forms – the objects of knowledge of the true philosopher ruler – but perhaps a case might also be made for pure pleasures of this kind being generated by contemplation of mathematical objects of some sort. Plutarch, however, describes a significantly more expansive notion, including among his list of appropriate sources of pleasure not only mathematics (1093Dff.) but also the study of literature, history and the like. For Plutarch, we take pleasure in learning the truth even if these are truths related to contingent facts, in other words: what might be otherwise (1093A–C). All these, we are asked to agree, are rejected by the Epicureans as part of a blanket rejection of cultural and intellectual pursuits in favour of a concentration on the most basic physical needs.

This brings me to what is troubling me right now. Does Plutarch include here pleasures not belonging to the rational soul, strictly speaking, or is the expansion in the scope of pleasures assigned to the rational soul is licensed by Plutarch’s acceptance of a dual nature of that aspect of human psychology? In other words, does Plutarch have a dual account of the rational soul? At the moment, I think he does. In Non posse, he gives a reasonably clear indication that he sees the working of the rational soul being turned to two separate but related functions. At 1092E he describes the types of pleasure which a human ought properly to pursue, neither of which is grasped by the appetitive and bestial soul emphasised by the Epicureans. Rather the pleasures which we ought to pursue come...

ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας...

from the theoretical or learning-loving part or else the action-guiding and beauty-loving part of the mind... [1]

Do the alternatives mentioned correspond to two aspects of the rational part of the soul – one theoretical and the other practical – or do they correspond to the rational and ‘spirited’ parts of the soul more or less on the model of the tripartite soul of Plato’s Republic? In favour of the former option is Plutarch’s preceding comment that the good he is discussing is the good appropriate to the soul, what is truly ‘psychic’, has no mixture of pain and the like – all of which suggests that there are somehow still meant to capture the essence of the pure pleasures which Socrates discusses in the Republic. The former alternative would also appear to give a more satisfying overall coherence to his view, since the pleasures he goes on to list are hard to assign to the thumoeides but are instead, broadly speaking, aesthetic and cultural, concerned with particular stories, works, or occasions. They are therefore just the class of items which it would be hard to assign to the theoretical aspect of reason, if that is concerned with necessary and eternal abstract objects and truths. But they are on the other hand certainly related in some sense to a rational appreciation, a general love of acquiring beliefs and information about particular or contingent facts.

[1] The full context reads: ἃς δ’ ἄξιον καὶ δίκαιον εὐφροσύνας καὶ χαρὰς νομίζεσθαι, καθαραὶ μέν εἰσι τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ σφυγμὸν οὐδένα κεκραμένον οὐδὲ δηγμὸν οὐδὲ μετάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ γνήσιον καὶ οὐκ ἐπείσακτον αὐτῶν τἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄλογον, ἀλλ’ εὐλογώτατον ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας φυόμενον. Plutarch’s use of the term διάνοια elsewhere is not easy to pin down. It may be used perhaps as simply a synonym for ψυχή, but on other occasions has an apparently more restricted reference to the rational or ‘hegemonic’ part of the soul (Virt. mor. 441C, cf. 451B; De fato 571D; De soll. anim. 960A, 960C, 963D, 969C; Quaest. Plat. 1001D, 1002A).

Troop transport

On the way to Oxford, I shared a carriage on the Cambridge-London train with five students, most - I think - from Anglia Ruskin University, who were on their way to some kind of Army training session. There were probably members of the Officer Training Corps, but in any case they were clearly militarised in some sense: they all had huge camouflaged packs and were speaking the lingo, peppering their chat with acronyms like RSM and swapping stories of 'knocks' taken in previous training sessions. On the other hand, they were clearly not yet fully enlisted. They were all still too relaxed and had the unmistakable air of students with at least a year of a course to go, just at the beginning of a long summer vacation.

In some ways, they were a very modern bunch. All were checking the phones regularly, texting friends, chatting about Facebook-planned events; one even had brought a laptop along with him. But this was also a very old-fashioned scene. They had all received their papers -- via email, I think -- telling them where to muster, which train to catch, what kit to bring, and the like. And when the excitement of meeting up again had worn off, even though they were not - I assume - really off to any genuine conflict zone, an odd quiet came over them all. Nerves, perhaps, as well as an kind of exhaustion.

These men were at most two years away from doing this journey 'for real', should they sign up properly for the army. And in that case they really would have been off to some genuine danger. It's after all not very likely that in the next two years the British Army will not be committed to action in various places across the world. I wonder if they were thinking about that. I wonder what would make someone, right now, join the army. Adventure? Excitement? National pride? Duty? I can appreciate some of these motives, but I certainly felt no envy at all for what they were off to do.

Plutarch

I'm off on Sunday to a short conference in Oxford on Plutarch and philosophy. I've listed the papers below in case you're interested. I'm a bit of an amateur in this company so I shall probably learn quite a lot.

Professor Fran Titchener (Utah State University), ‘Plutarch’s attitude towards history in the Moralia’

Professor Aurelio Perez Jimenez (University of Malaga), ‘Fatalism, providence and liberty in Plutarch’s Lives’

Professor Luc van der Stockt (University of Leuven), ‘Emulation and rivalry: a ‘popular philosophical’ theme in Plutarch’

Professor Frederick Brenk (Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome), ‘Plutarch the theologian and the philosophy of his time’

Professor Judith Mossman (University of Nottingham), ‘Philosophy of language in Plutarch’

Dr Eleni Kechagia (University of Oxford),’ Plutarch on ancient atomism’

Professor Donald Russell, ‘Plutarch and Quintilian- a dialogue’

Professor John Dillon (Trinity College Dublin), ‘Plutarch as an interpreter of Plato’

Professor Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp (University of Bonn), ‘Plutarch’s Aristotelian mood’

Professor Jan Opsomer (University of Cologne), ‘Explanatory principles in Plutarch’s philosophy of nature’

Professor Keimpe Algra (University of Utrecht ), ‘Plutarch on Stoic Theology and Demonology’

Dr James Warren (University of Cambridge), ‘Plutarch and Epicurean pleasure in the Non posse’

Dr Mauro Bonazzi (University of Milan), ‘Plutarch on the difference between the Academics and Pyrrhonists’

England 2 Columbia 0

Kirsty MacColl's 'best of', Galore, is on rotation in the car at the moment. You should buy it if you don't have it already. This isn't on it, but it's also terrific. Super chorus.

Why no 'soul' in Plato's Crito?

I'm giving some lectures on Plato's Crito next year so I thought I'd better re-read the thing carefully. I don't think I'd been through it properly since I read it as part of my first-year undergraduate Intensive Greek classes. I like it; certainly I like it more than the Ion, which it will replace in the first-year syllabus.

Anyway, I'm intrigued by Crito 47d3-6 and 47e7-48a1. There, famously, Socrates appears to be referring to a relatively familiar -- albeit paradoxical -- idea of his, namely that what matters most to one's welfare is the welfare of one's soul and that the welfare of one's soul is determined by whether one commits just acts -- which benefit the soul -- or unjust acts -- which harm it. However, Socrates does not once refer to the soul in this dialogue and he appears to go out of his way not to do so. Here are the passages:

ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.

If we do not follow this, we will destroy and harm that which becomes better by what is just and is destroyed by what is unjust. (47d3-6)

Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρ’ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

But should we live with that thing destroyed which the unjust harms and the just benefits? Or should we think this less important than the body whatever part of us this is which injustice and justice concern? (47e7-48a1)

It would be odd, to say the least, if what Socrates is referring to here were not 'the soul'. So why doesn't he come out and say it? True, what matters in this argument is that there is something or other which justice -- specifically the agent's commission of just acts -- benefits and which the agent's own commission of injustice will harm. What this is, precisely, is not so crucial right now. On the other hand, Socrates is not squeamish elsewhere about talking of souls. Why not here too?

I don't think the answer is just that Crito is 'unphilosophical' and would not get it [1]. Crito is an old hand at Socratic conversations, so we learn in the dialogue, and it would be odd if he hadn't picked up something along the line. It would be odd indeed, if he were so 'unphilosophical' that Socrates felt he had to resort to a somewhat obscure circumlocution to get his point across rather than just come out with a psychological thesis.

But there must be some reason. I'm still pondering, but I suspect the answer has to do with two further points [2].

1. The other important part of the dialogue must be Socrates' dream (at 44b) which certainly implies that Socrates is happy with the idea of some kind of survival after death, particularly if what matters here is the idea of a return home 'on the third day', that is: when he dies. Crito doesn't see what Socrates is getting at here either, of course (44b4) but that still doesn't make him 'unphilosophical'...

2. Crito himself is certainly not quite getting the point of Socrates' views in the dialogue, but it seems to me that this is a sign of something rather important that the Crito as a whole is trying to stress. What's wrong with Crito is not (just) that he is invoking the wrong sort of values (the welfare of philoi, family, reputation, money and the like) in putting the case for escape. These are perhaps, in a sense, 'unphilosophical', but that's not really the problem. The real problem is that Crito has followed and agreed to various Socratic arguments in the past, the conclusions of which Socrates still holds true and which are dictating Socrates' decision to remain in prison. Crito, however, seems to be able to follow these arguments only when they are not immediately relevant and applicable to a loved-one. Socrates is willing to reconsider the case, of course, but Crito will need to give the right kind of arguments to make him change his mind. So Crito is not 'unphilosophical' most generally; he is just not philosophical enough in this sense: he finds it hard to remain consistent with his argued principles when placed under the most testing personal circumstances. (It is revealing, then, that Crito cannot respond to Socrates' questions any further when he is explicitly asked to apply a general principle to the current situation: 49e9-50a3, the switch to the first person is marked, I'd say.)

How do these points help with the opening question? Perhaps, and this is perhaps a weak suggestion, Socrates is trying to persuade Crito as gently as he can that he really should just stick to the conclusions they had reached time and time before. Introducing any very strong psychological theses such as the idea of post mortem survival would potentially muddy the waters here when what matters is just the re-affirmation of the ban on wrong-doing and injustice, even in retaliation. Similarly, asserting that doing injustice harms the soul would potentially lead the conversation into unnecessary worries that would not help Socrates' case, nor help Crito deal with his particular and pressing crisis of philosophical faith.

[1] See e.g. R. Weiss, Socrates dissatisfied (Oxford, 1998, 43 and n.12).

[2] I'm particularly benefiting from re-reading V. Harte's 'Conflicting values in Plato's Crito' AGP 81, 117-47, reprinted in this handy collection.

More taxonomy

Another blow for the VAT man: Pringles are officially not potato crisps (for one thing, they are less than 50% potato). They should be less expensive from now on. On the downside, they are clearly made of something very odd indeed: watch this demonstration of how flammable they are. Puts you off.

Probably good news for Pringles, overall, despite making public the precise components of the things and they only just won a court case proving that they are not satanic. Watching them burn makes you wonder, though...