Pleasures

I've just found this interesting entry in the Suda (eta 97):

Ἐκ τῶν Πλωτίνου. Ἡδοναί, λύπαι, θάρρη, φόβοι, ἐπιθυμίαι,
ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν, τίνος ἂν εἶεν; ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης
ψυχῆς σώματι ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. ἢ γὰρ
τὸ μῖγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. Ὅροι ἡδονῆς, αʹ λεία κίνησις,
βʹ ἢ γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, γʹ ἢ ἄλογος διάχυσις, δʹ ἢ ἐνέργεια (5)
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνεμπόδιστος, εʹ ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν τέλος
ταῖς τελευταίαις ἐνεργείαις. ἐκ τούτων τῶν ὅρων ἰσχύει τις ἀνα-
σκευάζειν καὶ κατασκευάζειν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι μή. Ἡδονὴ
δέ ἐστι λεία κίνησις, πόνος δὲ τραχεῖα κίνησις. καὶ τὴν μὲν εὐδοκη-
τὴν πᾶσι ζῴοις, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρουστικόν. ἡδονὴν μέντοι τὴν τοῦ σώμα- (10)
τος, ἣν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, οὐ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐπ’
ἀναιρέσει ἀλγηδόνων καὶ οἷον ἀοχλησίαν τέλος εἶναι φασί. διαφέρει
δὲ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν,
εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦν-
ται καὶ αἱ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. εἶναί τε τὴν μερικὴν (15)
ἡδονὴν δι’ αὑτὴν αἱρετήν, τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι’ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’
αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν. ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία,
τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα,
ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς, τέρψις δὲ οἷον τρέψις, (20)
προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον• διάχυσις δὲ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.
ἔστι δὲ περὶ ἑκατέρου μέρους τῆς ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμὸς ἔνδοξος.
ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή, δείκνυσιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὗτος• οὗ πάντα
ἐφίεται, ἀγαθόν• τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ πάντα ἐφίεται• ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν.
τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος• τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ• (25)
ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθοὺς οὐ ποιεῖ• οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. ἡ ἡδονὴ τοίνυν
ἐστὶ κίνησις λεία• ἐνέργεια δὲ ἀτελὴς πᾶσα κίνησις• μηδὲν δὲ ἀγαθὸν
ἀτελές• ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

This is the translation from the Suda online:

From the writings of Plotinus. [Pleasures,] pains, recklessness, fears, aversions and to feel pain of mind, to what do they belong? For they belong either to the soul or the soul making use of the body or a third thing composed of both. This latter can be understood in two senses, too: for it is either a mixture or some other thing resulting from a mixture. Definitions of pleasure: 1, a smooth movement; or 2, a perceptible process of generation toward nature; or 3, an irrational relaxation; or 4, an unhindered activity of a natural condition; or 5, an end following the complete activities. Taking these definitions as a starting point, one is able to support and to overthrow the thesis that pleasure is a good and that it is not a good. Pleasure is a smooth movement but distress is a rough movement; and while the former is well-pleasing for every animal, the latter is repulsive. They say that the bodily pleasure that is also an end, is not a pleasure pertaining to a state, the one consisting of taking away of pains of mind, such as freedom from disturbance; they say that bodily pleasure is also an end. The end is different from happiness, for the end is particular pleasure but the structure consisting of particular pleasures with which we measure past and future pleasures, is happiness. And particular pleasure is worth choosing by itself, but happiness is not worth choosing by itself but by particular pleasures. Pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be worth choosing. Under it are arranged fascination, joy at another's misfortune, enjoyment, relaxation. Now fascination is a pleasure which fascinates one through one's hearing sense. Joy at another's misfortune is a pleasure at someone else's bad things; enjoyment, as a turning, is a certain conversion of the soul towards the dissolute; relaxation is the dissolving of virtue. There is an acknowledged syllogistic argument of the contradictory position concerning each part "of the thesis whether pleasure is a good or is not a good". The following syllogistic argument shows that pleasure is a good: the good is that at which all things aim. All things aim at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good. On the contrary, the argument that shows that pleasure is not a good is the following: the good makes men good. Pleasure does not make men good. Therefore, pleasure is not a good. In fact, pleasure is a smooth movement, but every movement is an incomplete activity. However, no good is incomplete. Consequently, pleasure is not a good.

It's clearly a 'bricolage' (is that the term?) of bits and pieces from various authors and the online Suda entry (here) does a good job of pointing to the various places in Plotinus, the Cyrenaic doxography of DL 2, and Aristotle where the various parts can be found in their original context.

What I think is very interesting, however, is this comment after the list of 'definitions' of pleasure:

ἐκ τούτων τῶν ὅρων ἰσχύει τις ἀνασκευάζειν καὶ κατασκευάζειν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι μή.

Taking these definitions as a starting point, one is able to support and to overthrow the thesis that pleasure is a good and that it is not a good.

Perhaps someone out there who knows the Suda better might be able to help me out. It looks to me as if the list of 'definitions', all of which have some decent philosophical pedigree, is being offered as a kind of toolkit for dialectical tussles.

The closest I can find is Aristotle Topics 120a6-31 in which 'pleasure is good' or 'pleasure is not good' are taken as examples of theses which can be rejected because they have not been properly specified. It is not clear immediately whether what is meant is that 'all pleasures are good' or 'some pleasure is good' and so on. The point here, however, does not turn on what the nature of pleasure is taken to be (although in dialectical exchanges this might well turn out to be a relevant piece of information). Also interesting are the arguments in lines 22-26 of the Suda entry which demonstrate that it is possible to argue on both sides of this question.

Pro: What everything aims at is the good; everything aims at pleasure; so pleasure is the good.
Con: The good makes men good; pleasure does not make men good; so pleasure is not the good.

The 'Pro' argument is recognisably Eudoxan (see NE 10.2). The 'Con' argument can be found in Alexander's commentary on the Topics (In Top. 2.26-9 and elsewhere (pp.28, 77, 262).

The closest parallel of all is in Anon. Expos. Ars. Rhet. 743.7-16 Walz. But I don't know anything about this text or its supposed date. Can anyone help? Here it is:

ἔστι δὲ προβλήματα διαλεκτι-
κὰ καὶ ὧν εἰσιν ἐναντίοι συλλογισμοί· ἀπορίαν γὰρ ἔχει,
πότερον οὕτως ἔχει ἢ οὐχ οὕτως, διὰ τὸ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων
εἶναι λόγους πιθανούς. τὴν γὰρ ἡδονήν ἐστι καὶ ὡς ἀγα- (10)
θὸν συλλογίσασθαι, καὶ ὡς κακὸν, καὶ ἀμφότερα διὰ
λόγων πιθανῶν· ὅθεν ἀπορεῖν ἐστι, ποτέρῳ ἄν τις προσ-
τιθείη. καὶ κατασκευάζεται μὲν, ὡς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὕτω.
τῆς ἡδονῆς πάντα ἐφίεται· οὗ δὲ πάντα ἐφίεται, ἀγα-
θόν· ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν. πάλιν ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, ὡς οὐκ (15)
ἀγαθὸν, οὕτως· τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ· ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀ-
γαθοὺς οὐ ποιεῖ· ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν·